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In the light of Professor Dalhuisen's comments in the preceding article, 
Hiroshi Goto gives his view of the reasons behind the current economic crisis 
in Asia. The author also details his vision of the likely future course of events 
in this region.
D uring the 'economic boom' of the 1980s, Japan was proud of the fact that its economic system had reached 'international standards'   unaware that the bubble had 
been inflating to bursting point. The position taken by 
commentators now is obviously different. As far as the banking 
system is concerned, this has come about via a series of collapses 
of banks and securities' houses, coupled with scandals uncovered 
in the process. While no-one seems to have linked it to the Asian 
economic crises, a closer look at what is happening inside Japan's 
banking system, especially in terms of its regulatory structure, 
might help identify the root of the problem in this Tiger economy
It was a traditional 'national game' for Japanese business 
entities to 'put a lid on something pungent'; in other words, to 
hide any corporate scandal from the public. The root of the 
problem was sokaiya, or corporate racketeers, to whom 
companies made jllegal payments, in return for their promise not 
to disclose such scandals in meetings. This particular type of 
problem   that of corporate morale   is why the media, lawyers 
and business people are looking at 'corporate governance' 
problems differently from their counterparts in the Anglo- 
American business field.
Currently, however, the problem is of a different type   
integrity in banking supervision and accountability in the 
accounting system. This concern has been further fuelled by the 
politicians dealing with these problems; and also by the bail-out 
of the entire Japanese economy due to the long-term recession.
BANKING SUPERVISION -JAPANESE STYLE?
As Professor Dalhuisen points out, the Japanese have tended to 
take temporary and patchy measures to solve problems: to rectify 
only that which is clearly identifiable and 'pretend that all others 
do not exist'. Despite public expectations of success with the Big 
Bang programme, it became clear that the Ministry itself, 
although the originator of the programme, was the very party 
which could do nothing but confirm the above observation, as 
the scandals were scrutinised one after another.
The following two cases clearly show what is now defined as 
'systemic corruption' at the heart of what was once thought to be 
the driving force behind Japan's position as the world's number 
one economy. All those watching the Japanese economy must have 
realised that the key to success was the Ministry of Finance's 
'convoy strategy', at the end of the Second World War, whereby it
would never allow any banking or securities firm to collapse. 
Whenever any firm was under threat of insolvency, the Ministry 
made the most of its uncodified regulatory power to revive these 
firms, at the expense of other, healthier companies. It had no reason 
to doubt that the best way to maintain economic confidence in 
Japan was to keep firms under supervision afloat; but the problems 
derived out of the scandals seem to have proved it wrong.
The 'Objective' Approach
One example emerged during the course of the liquidation of 
Yamaichi Securities. When share prices in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange began to fall from 1990 onwards, Yamaichi was under 
threat of legal action by one client over losses incurred as a result, 
it was alleged, of 'bad management' of clients' funds in a 
discretionary account. The troubleshooting device which enabled 
these losses to 'disappear' from the balance sheets of either 
Yamaichi or its clients was tobashi, or 'transfer' of the losses to other 
companies having a different financial year. This enabled these 
losses never to appear or be recognised on the balance sheets of any 
of those involved at the end of the relevant financial year.
While Yamaichi had been successful in hiding the losses from 
the public, it was finally uncovered during the process of due 
diligence after its collapse. But this discovery was accompanied 
by another eye-opening allegation; a Yamaichi director confessed 
that tobashi was recommended by a Finance Ministry official! 
The 'Subjective' Approach
Although the matter is still under investigation in the Yamaichi 
case, it is not the first of its kind. The fraudster involved in the 
Daiwa Bank scandal, in New York in 1995, wrote in his book The 
Confession, that Finance Ministry officials tried to conceal the 
huge losses he made from the US Federal Reserve Bank.
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Another scandal   a more serious one   followed immediately 
after that: two inspectors from the Banking Bureau of the 
Ministry were arrested, having allegedly received bribes fromJ ' o o J
those banks which were subject to their supervision. Those who 
knew how bank inspections were conducted (and here I speak 
from personal knowledge) must have been surprised at the 
arrests and confused as to why the prosecutors blew the whistle 
on something they had not previously been concerned about.
Every major Japanese bank is said to have middle managerial 
staff in charge of liaising with Finance Ministry officials for 
information. The information includes details of the expected
date of the visit by inspectors, which is supposed to be kept 
strictly secret. Staff are expected to obtain this information by 
offering a number of 'entertainment options' such as games of 
golf, package holidays overseas and, in an extreme case, dinners 
in a Japanese hot-pot restaurant where waitresses wear no 
underwear! In so doing, the banks successfully hid non- 
performing debts from the inspectors. This was the 'trick', as one 
newspaper editor wrote, behind the most 'efficient' conduct of 
the inspections, albeit with a relatively small number of 
inspectors. As the investigation showed, one bank was alleged to 
have hidden the source of funds for illegal payments to a 
corporate racketeer from the inspectors.
JAPANESE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM v THE 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
What the Japanese banking system problem shares with the 
Asian financial crisis is the credit squeeze or lack of any sources 
from which to generate funds. Although the Tiger economies 
themselves partly contributed to this phenomenon, in Japan the 
main cause is, rather, a domestic one: the need for extra funds to 
write off the non-performing debts which accumulated during 
the 1980s economic boom. Other causes include the subsequent 
recession (including, perhaps, some part of the non-performing 
debts collected from their Asian clients) and their counter 
measures against the 'Japan premiums' added to the borrowings 
from their funding source after several major Japanese 
companies became insolvent late last year.
People have described the Japanese economy in the past by 
saying that 'once America sneezes, Japan will suffer from flu'. By 
the same token, the fatal collapse of Japanese banks would 
undoubtedly result in the death of the entire Japanese economy 
The chief concern for banks was the increase in hidden or 
unrealised losses in shares that form a major part of their assets. 
As a result, the government allowed companies, including banks 
and insurance companies, as a part of a series of stimulant 
packages for its economy, to assess the value of stocks subject to 
their assets at the price at which they were acquired, rather than 
at the prevailing market price. The expectation was that they 
could artificially inflate the value of their assets and thus relax their 
credit squeeze against their clients. There has been, however, a 
mixed reaction from those who were allowed to do so. This is 
because the measure goes against the 'global standard' trend,
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which is one of the goals to be achieved in the Big Bang
o o o
programme. The good news was that many banks and insurance 
companies were, at least initially, quite reluctant to take advantage 
of it: many became aware that the fact that the banks' choice of 
such an option could backfire, if the market construed it as a clear 
indication diat the banks were on the verge of collapse.
RELEVANCE TO THE CURRENT CRISES
It is clear from directories of Japanese public companies that 
the top five shareholders in most major banks are life insurance 
companies. Until now, it \vould not have occurred to these public 
companies to rail against the banks as shareholders, as both the 
Japanese economy and the banks' financial results were 
prospering. The party   perhaps the only party   at the centre of 
corporate governance for these banks was and still is, to some 
extent, the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry had enjoyed 
absolute power through an unwritten code called 'administrative 
guidance'. This 'guidance' is given by officials in the Ministry 
and, in fact, has the force of law. To the surprise of western 
lawyers, no lawyer could attend meetings between Ministry
officials and the bankers until recently, because every single word 
of that 'guideline' had 'the force of law' and there was absolutely 
no room for any other interpretation. Given what the scandals 
revealed, a question arises as to whether such governance 
structure was accountable or not.
While the economy prospered, nobody was concerned about 
this lack of transparency or accountability in corporate governance 
as regards the banks   in turn at the centre of governance for other
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Japanese businesses   through equity ownership or debt facility 
extension. Now the economy itself is in a downturn, and such 
governance structure is losing its balance of power.
As time goes by the Ministry of Finance is losing its regulatory 
power over these banks as well as its face to the public. Thanks 
to the investigators' enthusiasm, however, banks are undero '
pressure to change their management structures and develop 
strategies to conform to the western standard. While that should 
be seen as a good thing, it is regrettable this change did not take 
place much earlier: the author suspects that the economic boom 
seen in the South East Asian region in the early 1990s had, given 
the resultant windfall for Japanese economy, made Japanese 
companies ignorant of their own problems, despite the 
emergence of the recession in the domestic economy at the time, 
and therefore made them reluctant to take appropriate action in 
time. Another problem which should be taken into account is 
that the pressure to which banks are subject does not seem to 
have reached other sectors, sectors that actually take the risks on 
major parts of non-performing debts in Asian countries by 
means of guaranteeing them to banks.
Up to the end of this financial year (March 1998), most risk- 
taking companies have benefited from the lack of effective 
insolvency provisions in these countries, as almost none of these 
technically insolvent debtors could so declare. Because of this, it 
went against the trend towards more transparency in the sense 
that Japanese creditors take the old-fashioned attitude and 
decide not to recognise these debts as bad ones. Given that 
Japanese 'banks' are estimated to have contributed to more than 
half the off-shore borrowing by Indonesian business interests as 
well as Thai, there has to be some doubt as to whether the 
financial statements, disclosed in June 1997 at annual general 
meetings, are transparent enough.
From April 1998 onwards, slight changes in such attitudes canr ' o o
be expected: apart from the enactment of the new bankruptcy 
law in Thailand, by which Japanese companies should be forced 
to recognise bad debts, these Japanese companies will surely face 
derivative pressure from the banks through pressure from 
outside. As the Big Bang programme's measures are 
implemented one by one, it is reasonably foreseeable that 
Japanese banks would prefer to adopt westernised criteria of risk 
analysis to companies, when extending credit facilities to them. 
Furthermore, these companies will have to face further pressure 
of a similar type from different groups such as foreign 
institutional shareholders, the Californian Public Employers' 
Retrirement System and new equity market participants such as 
Merrill Lynch. A real soft landing for the Japanese economy, and 
indeed its success, depends largely on the management of these 
Japanese companies and whether they correctly understand the 
pressure to turn their companies in the right direction. ®
Hiroshi Goto
Legal Department, Nissho Iwai Corporation
